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NOTES
FUTURE INTERESTS - RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
APPLIED TO OPTIONS IN FAVOR OF GRANTOR
TO PURCHASE BACK THE LAND CONVEYED
-MADDOX V. KEELER
The recent case of Maddox v. Keeler1 has introduced a new
attitude on the part of the Kentucky Court of Appeals towards
a phase of the law of future interests. In this case, one R. H.
Hopkins and wife conveyed by deed a fee simple title to
William Wheeler subject to this condition: "But this convey-
ance is on the condition that should the party of the Second
part desire to sell or convey away said tract of land the said
R. H. Hopkins is to have the option of becoming its purchaser
on the condition that he give therefor the sum of one thousand
dollars." Hopkins died intestate and his heir at law sought
to enforce the option against the devisee of Wheeler, who
wished to sell the land, having made improvements on it to the
extent of $13,000. The Court held the option void because it
violated the statute against perpetuities. In reaching this
result, the court felt it was necessary to overrule the earlier
case of Coley v. Hord.2
In the Coley Case, there was an option in favor of the
grantor and his heirs to purchase the land conveyed at any
time either the grantee or his heirs desired to sell it, with
.allowance to the grantee for the costs of any improvements
made by him which increased the value of the land. The Court
held that this option was enforceable since it was not within
the statute against perpetuities.
The essential difference in the two cases is that in the
Maddox Case the option was in favor of a named person with
no mention of heirs and assigns, while in the Coley Case the
option was in favor of the grantor and his heirs, thus demon-
strating that in the former case there is a strong indication
that the option is personal, while in the latter the option is
inheritable by the express language of the deed.
1296 Ky. 440, 177 S. W. (2d) 568 (1944).
-250 Ky. 250, 62 S. W. (2d) 792 (1933).
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The decision in Coley v. Hord is in conflict with the English
viw. Lozdoiz & Southwesterni R. Co. v. Gornnz3 is the controlling
English case on the question. Here, a railroad company con-
veyed land with a provision in the deed that the grantee, his
heirs and assigns, would reconvey to the company, its successors
or assigns, on six months' written notice and the payment of
£1,000. The railroad company sought to enforce this provision
against one claiming under the grantee but the court declined
to give relief, deciding that such a provision was an ultra vires
act on the part of the company and that the provision violated
the rule against perpetuities. The weight of American authority
supports this view.
4
The opinion in the Maddox Case ably disposes of Coley v.
Hord by showing that the cases cited as precedents were not in
point and that it was against the weight of authority.5 The
Maddox opinion is susceptible of criticism, however, in its
treatment of the nature of the interest in land which the option
created in favor of the grantor. The arguments of the Court,
reduced to a syllogistic form, may be briefly stated as follows:
first, interests in land susceptible of inheritance, since they go
on from generation to generation, may cause remoteness in vest-
ing; second, assuming this option to be an interest in land sus-
ceptible of inheritance, there is a possibility of remoteness in
vesting; third, since there is a possibility of remoteness in
vesting, the option violates the rule against perpetuities and it
is unnecessary to determine whether or not it is an interest in
land susceptible of inheritance. This is faulty logic on its
face. The way the propositions are set up, the possibility of
remoteness depends on the provision being construed as an
interest in land susceptible of inheritance; hence, the last part
of conclusion, that it is unnecessary to decide whether or not
the option is the required type of interest in land, contradicts
the second premise. It may well be said that the Court means
that any interest, personal or real, which might create a
possibility of remoteness may be held void as a violation of the
f'20 Ch. D. 562, 51 L. J. Ch. N. S. 530, 46 L. T. (N. S.) 449 (1882).
'Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352 (1892); Barton v.
Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914); Skeen v. Clichfield Coal
Corp., 137 W. Va. 397, 119 S. E. 89 (1922).
"-296 Ky. 440, 442, 117 S. W. (2d) 563, 569 (1944).
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rule against perpetuities, but this is certainly not made clear
by the option.
As has been pointed out, the option in the Maddox Case was
to a named person with no mention of heirs and assigns. The
present writer contends that the right was personal. The Court,
however, refused to discuss the point. It is clear, nevertheless,
that in order to bring the option under the rule forbidding re-
moteness in vesting, the Court had to construe the right as in-
heritable. That is exactly what they refused to do. It is much
easier to hold that the option in the Coley Case violated the rule
against perpetuities because there the right created was clearly
inheritable by the express terms of the deed which gave the right
to enforce the option to the grantor and his heirs. Therefore,
it is submitted that the Court erred in holding the option in the
Maddox Case violated the rule forbidding remoteness in vesting
because the interest created was personal by the plain wording
of the deed. Since the interest was personal, it could only be
exercised during the life of the grantor and hence could not
violate the rule against perpetuities as pronounced by the Ken-
tucky statute.6
It is submitted that these difficulties would be resolved by
holding that the option created an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. Although often confused and lumped together into
one rule, there are actually two major rules concerning future
estates. Mr. Gray, after noting the confusion and considering
the historical background, calls them "the Rule forbidding re-
straints on alienation" and "the Rule against Perpetuities.'
'7
The first was designed to prevent the taking from the owner of
the power to alienate property and the latter's purpose was to
prevent interests from being created in the too distant future.
The leading English case on the rule forbidding restraint on
alienations is Re Rosher.s  In this case, a testator devised land
subject to a proviso that if the devisee or any person claiming
under him should desire to sell the property or any part of it in
the lifetime of the testator's wife, she should have the option lo
GKRS 381.220: "The absolute power of alienation shall not be
suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period than during the continuation of a life or lives in being at the
creation of the estate, and twenty one years and ten months there-
after."
7 Note (1894) 7 HARv. L. REv. 406, 409.
'26 Ch. D. 801 (1829).
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purchase it at a certain price. The real value of the land was
five times the price. The Court held the proviso void as an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. By so doing it could
avoid the difficulties that the restraint was only in existence
during a life which was in being and that the estate had pres-
ently vested in the devisee on the death of the testator. There is
respectable American authority supporting this view and con-
struing such options as unreasonable restraints on alienation.
9
That this view should be taken in Kentucky is further sup-
ported by the fact that by statute any future estate is alien-
able,"' thus there is little reason to tie up estates so as to cause
remoteness in vesting. Kentucky has subscribed to the doctrine
of unreasonable restraint, independent of the statute,1 on which
the Maddox Case was decided, in situations where there was no
remoteness in vesting- but a restraint on alienation existed.
12
The statute was so constructed that the two rules were lumped
tolgyether and stated in terms of remoteness in vesting. There-
fore, the Court had to apply the unreasonable restraint doctrine
independent of the statute.
Gray clearly advocates the view that the option in the
Maddox Case should be construed as an illegal restraint on
alienation.13 Kales also appears to sustain this position,14 but
Simes apparently supports the view taken in the Maddox Case.' 3
"For an excellent discussion of the background of this rule and
its application, see Woodall v. Bruen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S. E. 170
(1915).
'KRS 381.040: "Any estate may be made to commence in the
future by deed, in like manner as by will, and any estate which
would be good as an executory devise or bequest shall be good if
created by deed."
"For the statute see supra n. 6
'"See Court v. Court's Guardian, 230 Ky. 241, 18 S. W. (2d) 957
(1929).
" GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed., 1942) sec.
330.1, at page 365: "They seem, therefore, to have found it neces-
sary, in order to prevent the enforcement of options extending over
too long a period, to declare such options void at law. Whether this
line of reasoning is correct, may be doubted; although the conclusion
that such options are wholly void, at law as well as in equity, may
well be supported on the ground that they would constitute illegal
restraints on alienation if damages were allowed for their breach."
14 KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed., 1920) sec. 665, at pp. 764,765.
iSnmEs, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) sec. 512, at page
379. The author points out situations where the restraint would not
be appreciable and concludes that the only course open is to follow
the English courts in holding that the options to purchase are within
L. J.--4
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When Maddox v. Keeler was presented for decision, the
Court had two alternatives if it wanted to void the option. It
could declare it void because it violated the rule against per-
petuities or it could hold it void as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. The first alternative is the one which it chose. The
fundamental difficulties which prevent this rule from operating
in this case have been pointed out. Therefore, we must deter-
mine if it was void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Kentucky has held that an attempt to restrain the alienation of
a fee simple estate devised by will during the entire life of the
devisee is void, as it is unreasonable.' 6  In the instant case we
have an attempt to restrain a fee simple estate for the life of
another. This would appear to be also unreasonable.
Therefore, it would appear that from the standpoint of
policy as well as precedent, Kentucky should continue to hold
such options void, not on the ground that they violate tlAe statute
against perpetuities, but for the reason that they constitute an
iinreasonable restraint on alienation.
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the rule against perpetuities. It should be pointed out, however,
that he does not consider the technical difficulties in applying the
rule against perpetuities to these situations.
I "Thurmond v. Thurmond, 190 Ky. 582, 228 S. W. 29 (1921);
Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264 (1909).
